Schrodinger's Cat in the Gettier's Case.

Contemporary philosophy has to consider many modern scientific issues. If we look at modern discussions, we find many new terms and concepts in philosophy. What do they really mean for our thinking in relation to the achievements of physics and mathematics?

I will discuss the classical account of knowledge, as a justified true belief, and the Gettier Problem, which showed that knowledge, cannot merely be justified true belief. The problem, which I raise here, is follow: how can affect such ideas as time and probability the analysis of propositional knowledge. Some examples of well-known Gettier's case are:

- You come to believe what the time is by looking at the clock in your kitchen. Usually this is a very reliable clock. Suppose the clock stopped. You come to the kitchen one morning at exactly 9 o'clock. Suppose the clock stopped exactly twenty-four hours earlier and you do not know about it. Therefore, if you look at the clock you have a justified belief that it is 9 o'clock. Do you know what time is it? You cannot know the time by looking at a stopped clock. Therefore, it is just a matter of luck that your belief is true.
- A farmer looks into a field through a window. He sees what looks very much like a sheep. Nevertheless, it is not a sheep. He is looking at a big hairy dog. It happens that at that moment there is a sheep hidden from to a farmer's view behind the big hairy dog. Does he know that there is a sheep in the field?

I want to remind of an example known as “The Schrodinger's Cat". It is a thought experiment posed by the Austrian physicist Erwin Schrodinger in 1935. It illustrates the problem of the Uncertainty Principle that incompatible conjugate properties cannot be defined for the same time and place in microcosm. This illustration applies to everyday objects. The particular case is a cat, a flask of poison and a radioactive source placed in a black box. If an internal monitor detects radioactivity (i.e. a single atom decay), the flask is shattered, releasing the poison that kills the cat. The atom's decay is a probabilistic process. Is the cat alive inside the box? Any physicist would say that the system is in the uncertain state. Literally, the cat is simultaneously alive and dead. We will not know the condition of the cat until the moment when we open the box. It gives us the simple thought that the state of a probabilistic system is unknown until we take a measure of the system. Before this moment, every state of the system is only probable.

Let us slightly change this experiment. There is an experimenter and another person. They are looking at the black box. The experimenter knows about the equipment in the box; the other person does not. The person sees the experimenter put the cat inside the box. Does the person know the cat is in the box? He could be justified in his belief that the cat is in the box because he saw it. If the experimenter opens the box, the cat is probably alive if any atoms have not decayed. Therefore, it may be true. It seems to be the case, which “looks like” the Gettier's case.

Thus, the question is: if we discribe a Gettier’s case do we really open “a box with a cat”? In other words, when I add to the discription any kinds bad or good luck (see Zagzebski, 1994) do I make a probabilistic event has occurred? Contextual analysis of Lottery paradox and Preface paradox shows that it is possible to make very fast shift in a context by adding very small piece of information (see Evnine, 1999).

May be in Gettier’s cases even when we assume that for an agent all events are happened, these events can have different epistemic state due to objective probabilistic character of the situation. Suppose, my friend has a flight from Londin to NY. I know he should have landed in a particular moment but I have no confirmation about that fact. After a while I get phone call from him. It is permissible to say that I know friend’s status when I get the call. Moreover, before that the proposition “my friend landed” doesn’t make sense for me but, of course, it does for the crew mambers and airports service.

Thesis.

Many attempts to add a condition to the JTB which captures a lot of counterexamples use the language of formal epistemology. For example, sensitivity and safety conditions use the term “nearby possible world” (see Pritchard, 2007). I aim to consider other approuch and take Tarski’s account of Theory of Truth. Contextualism provides the explanation that a knowledge-ascriber’s context determine standards for knowledge. Moreover, different contexts entail possibility of different truth value for proposition (see Brendel and Jager, 2004).Further, contextualism builds constraints along degree of salience for an agent to get a mistake in the particular context. We can choose other way for attribution epistemic states for different contexts by using Tarski’s account and build recursive scheme. Thus, in a Gettier’s case an agent operates with proposition

**p**: “ a sheep is at the field”. The

**p**is false. In the other hand, an outside observer uses meta-language where

**p**is true.

Objection.

This approuch captures many counterexampels in relation to the environmental luck. But close inspection shows that clock - example (1) still doesn’t solved. Actually, it reveals that time is really crucial element of substence of luck. Coincidence of events occurs in time and when the time is matter of coincidence we rather have a pure paradox. The Tarski’s T-schema is working properly with assertion of the form “S knows that ⌐

**p**at

**t**¬ iff

**p**at

**t**”. When we consider Russell’s clock case the situation is follow: “S knows that ⌐

**t**at

**t**¬ iff

**t**”. As we see T-schema doesn’t bring matter of fact in this case but as far as I understand this is only one countrexample which can reflect complexity of obtaining knowledge about time itself.

Conclusion.

In conclusion, note that our assumptions presupposes that such ideas as luck, probablility, coincidence, etc. can affect substance of agent’s epistemic state. In favor of that, we can turn to some convincing examples from physics and mathematics. Thus, the narrative of Gettier’s cases forms some kind of analogy of a “liar sentence” and, hence, can be captured by Tarski’s truth account.